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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------------BEVERLY KERR,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

••
••

THOMAS ALDEN KERR,

Case No. 18329

••

Defendant-Appellant.

••

------------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
AND DISPOSITION BY THE COURT BELOW
This appeal arises out of a Motion of Defendant for the
Modification of a Divorce Decree reducing or eliminating the
payment of alimony and child support and Plaintiff's Order to
Show Cause seeking payment of back alimony through August of
1981 in the amount of $5,891.00.

After an evidentiary hearing

held on August 24, 1981, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., District Judge, the Court denied Defendant's Motion
for Modification and awarded Plaintiff a Judgment for $5,891.00
in unpaid alimony through August, 1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an Order of this Court vacating the
Judgment of the trial court and awarding Defendant a reduction of alimony and/or child support retroactively to the
date the Motion for Modification was filed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
While Defendant in the Statement of Facts contained
in his brief on this appeal makes some ostensible effort
to summarize the evidence taken by the trial court, the
Defendant fails to review or even acknowledge significant
testimony upon which the decision of the trial court was
based.

For that reason, Plaintiff has little choice but

to expand upon the statement of facts set forth in Def endant' s brief.
On April 5, 1979, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District Judge, entered his Memorandum Decision granting divorce to each of the parties, distributing the marital property and setting child support and alimony. (R. 183-88).

The

Memorandum Decision was followed by the Court's entry of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 207-18) and a
Judgment and Decree of Divorce (R. 219-24) on May 11, 1979.
Both the Memorandum Decision and the Judgment and Decree of
Divorce provided for the payment of $799.00 per month alimony,
and $450.00 per month child support for the minor child of
the parties.

In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Findings of

Fact (R. 213-14), the Court expressly recognized that the
amounts awarded for child support and alimony would not
cover the costs and expenses of maintaining the Plaintiff
and the minor child of the parties in the family home, and
-

2 -
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that the Plaintiff would accordingly be required to look to
her own resources and income to supplement those support and
maintenance payments.
In compliance with the directive of Judge Conder, Plaintiff in fact did look to her own separate income and assets
for partial maintenance of herself and the minor son of the
parties.

The investment income, however, was simply insuffici-

ent to pay the bills and during the year 1979, Plaintiff was
required to liquidate and deplete her assets by the sum of
$3,600.00. (R. 934).

As a consequence of her inability to

meet her living expenses from her interest and dividend income without depleting the assets from which that income
was derived, Plaintiff sought employment and commenced working
for the Veteran's Administration in October of 1979. (R. 933).
Plaintiff was asked why she simply didn't continue to deplete
those assets in lieu of seeking employment.

Her answer was

as follows:
"Well, the interest I get from my assets
helps pay the expenses. If I use them
all up now, they would be gone in two, two
and a half years, and I would not have that
income. At this point, I can't get work
that is going to pay more than I am making
now, and I need that money to operate."
(R. 934-35).

The evidence further reflected that Plaintiff's total income for the year 1981 through the date of the hearing in the
court below, excluding any alimony or child support, was
$4,365.06 from her employment, together with an additional
- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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$4,688.03 from interest and dividends, for a total of
$9,053.09. (Ex. 5-P).

During the same period of time, Plain-

tiff's total expenses in maintaining herself and her minor
son was $17,529.46,
$8,500.00.

(Ex. 6-P) or a short fall of nearly

In as much as she had received only $4,900.00 in

child support and alimony payments from Defendant through
August of 1981, (Ex. 5-P) Plaintiff had been required to
further liquidate an additional $3,012.00 in assets in order
to make up the short fall.

(R. 936).

Plaintiff also testified

that the expenditures shown on Exhibit 6-P reflected only
cash outlays made during the year to date and did not inelude other debts, including counsel fees, that she had
not been able to pay. (R. 936).
Defendant testified that his net income, after taxes,
had gone from $3,257.58 at the time of the original trial
in 1978 (Defendant's Exhibit 4), to $2,302.32 for the first
eight months of 1981. (Ex. 3-D).

No evidence was introduced

regarding any change in expenses or other circumstances of
Defendant.

Defendant's net average income from the practice

of dentistry included a net income for the month of April of
only $298.37.

(Ex. 3-D).

His gross receipts for that month

however, were within $500 of the preceding month and nearly
$2,000 more than the gross receipts for May.

(Ex. 3-D).

The

unusually low net income for April was the consequence of a
one-time non-recurring expense of nearly $3,000.00 for the
repair of certain dental equipment. (R. 923).
Defendant claimed it was the combination of the change
- 4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of circumstances of Plaintiff obtaining employment and Defendant's reduction in income which required the modification
of the divorce decree with respect to the payment of alimony
and child support.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSING TO MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

The Standard on This Appeal.
In arguing before this Court that all that need be shown

to justify a modification of the Decree of Divorce is a change
in circumstances, Defendant has significantly understated the
standard against which this appeal must be judged.

As noted

by this Court in Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155,
158 (1973) Defendant's burden is more than just a mere change
in circumstances.

This Court put it as follows:

"Defendant must furthermore sustain
the burden of proving that there has been
a substantial change in the material circumstances of either one or both of the
parties since the decree was entered.
[Emphasis as in original.]
This same principle was later reinforced in Carter v. Carter,
563 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1977) where this Court delineated the
scope of its review of a denial by the trial court of a motion
to modify a divorce decree.
"As opposed to Defendant's insistence
that the trial court should have modified
the decree, it is appropriate to have in
mind that the burden of persuading the trial
court that there has been such a change in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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circumstances as to justify such modification
rests upon him; and that the same rules of
review apply in supplementary proceedings,
as in original divorce matters; that is, that
we survey the record in the light most f avorable to the findings and determination
made by the trial court; and that we do
not interfere therewith unless it appears
that the evidence clearly preponderates
against his findings or that he abused
his discretion." [Emphasis added.]
The evidence in the record does not clearly preponderate
against the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion, but to
the contrary clearly
the trial court.

supports and sustains the decision of

When Defendant's appeal is measured against

the criteria established in the above-referenced case law, it
is apparent that the Judgment of the trial court should be
sustained.
2.

A Change in Defendant's Income Does Not Automatically Result

In a Modification of the Divorce Decree.
Defendant seems to believe that a reduction in his income
axiomatically requires a reduction in the payment of child
support and alimony.

That argument was quickly dispatched by

this Court in Carter v. Carter, supra.

There, a defendant who

had been in good health at the time of the divorce decree and
earning approximately $21,000 per year in construction work
had suffered some impairment in his health and his earning
capacity had been reduced to $12,000 per year.

The defendant

accordingly sought a reduction in alimony from $200 per month
to $100 per month.

The trial court denied the request for

modification and on appeal, this Court affirmed.
-

At 563 P.2d

6 -
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178~79,

the Court laid out the following rule, which is

dispositive of Defendant's contention on this appeal:
"In regard to the major problem, the
defendant's argument that the evidence
compels a reduction in the alimony payment from $200 to $100 per month. He is
mistaken in his assumption that the amount
of alimony payable should be correlated
in percentage to his income, to be scaled
up or down as his income may vary. His
earning capacity and his income are, of
course, important factors to be considered.
But that is only part of the total circumstances to be considered as to what is
appropriate and equitable. Another major
one is what are plaintiff's needs and
requirements; and there is no showing that
there has been any decrease therein."
Defendant's contentions in the instant case are clearly
subject to the same fate.

Defendant has shown nothing more

than a claimed change in his level of income.

Defendant's

average net monthly income for the eight months of 1981 was
still over $2,300 per month, even including the abberational
month of April.

No effort was made and no evidence was in-

troduced to show that a net income after taxes of $2,300 per
month was not sufficient to meet the alimony and child support
obligations imposed in the original divorce decree of $1,249.00
per month.

!/

!/

If anything, the evidence in the record is to the contrary. SUbsequent
to the entry of the Divorce Decree, the ~fendant made a voluntacy
$3,200 investnent in Pardners Restaurants (R. 907) and during 1981,
gave an autorrobile to one of the married children of the parties at the
very time he was refusing to make the alinony payments to the Defendant. (R. 909). This hardly sounds like a person living on the edge
of poverty.

- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

Plaintiff's Need for Alimony and Child Support Has Not

Diminished.
As this court noted in Carter, of at least equal importance with Defendant's claimed diminished income is the continued need and requirements of the Plaintiff.

In spite of

Plaintiff's obtaining employment with the Veteran's Administration, those needs and requirements have not materially changed
since the time of the Divorce Decree.
As noted earlier in the Statement of Facts, Judge Conder
in the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recognized that the alimony and child support payments awarded to
Plaintiff would be insufficient to meet the expenses of Plaintiff and the minor child of the parties.

Judge Conder expressly

indicated that Plaintiff would be required to supplement the
the alimony and child support awarded from the Defendant and
provide a portion of those needs herself.

As Plaintiff testi-

fied, the sum of $4,000 in income earned by Plaintiff from the
investments and savings awarded to her as her separate property
was simply inadequate to make up the full short fall between
the child support and alimony and her every day and normal
living expenses.
As a consequence of the continued short fall, Plaintiff
was forced to deplete the very assets upon which that needed
income was generated, liquidating $3,600 of those assets in 1979
with an additional $3,000 having been liquidated in the first
eight months of 1981.

In order to provide the continued sup-

plementary income which was clearly anticipated by Judge
- 8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Conder, Plaintiff was left with only one viable choice.

She

could not continue to deplete the assets upon which her income was dependent.
ment.

The only alternative was to seek employ-

It is only by the combination of the income derived

from her employment, together with the continued interest
and dividends from her separate investments that Plaintiff is
able to make up the short fall between her actual expenses
and the award of alimony and child support granted by the
Decree of Divorce.

ll

Defendant erroneously contends that whatever may have been
anticipated by Judge Conder at the time of the original Divorce Decree is immaterial, and that the only fact which the
trial court in the instant case was entitled to examine was
that Plaintiff was not working at the time of the original
Decree, and was working at the time of the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Modification.

That is not, however, the

case law of this State.

2 /Defendant's argument that Plaintiff had voluntarily limited her \te10rk
hours when she could have further augmented her incane by working
additional hours per week is of little relevance in this case. Working the available additional hours would have resulted in adding only
$48 every two weeks to Plaintiff's gross incane. (R. 943). Plaintiff
further testified that the reason why she had cut back her hours fran
a full 40 hours per week to 32 hours was to enable her to be hone at
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon when her son arrived hone fran school.
She testified that her presence at hare and the supei:vision that
added had resulted in an increase in grade point average for the
child from a 1.8 to 3.1. (R. 944). Would Defendant really have
Plaintiff trade that needed parental supervision for an increase
in gross incare of some $96.00 per I1Dnth?
- 9 -
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In Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620, 624 (1972)

this Court expressed the applicable rule as follows:
"[A] divorce decree containing awards for
support based on either expressed or assumed facts contemplated by . • • the court
• • • should not be modified when the contemplated facts are obvious or agreed to by
the parties and in turn incorporated in the
decree, in which event the continuous jurisdiction of the court to modify should not
be used to thwart the expressed or obvious
intentions of the • • • court - unless such
contemplated facts lead to manifest injustice or unconscionable inequity."
There is no doubt that where the findings of the trial court
expressly anticipate that the plaintiff will be required to
supplement alimony and child support payments through her own
income, the foregoing rule is applicable and the subsequent
obtaining of employment by the Plaintiff does not constitute
a material change in circumstances.

In Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah

2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 (1970), this Court rejected a claim for
reduction in alimony and child support payments predicated
upon the fact that the plaintiff had obtained employment subsequent to the entry of the original decree of divorce.

In

finding that there had been no material change in circumstances,
the Court noted:
"[T]he decree of divorce, when granted,
contemplated that the Plaintiff would
secure employment and contribute to her
own support."
See, also, Short v. Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971).
Again, Defendant has simply failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in
- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

finding that there was no substantial change in any material
circumstance.

Defendant's appeal is without merit and the

judgment below should be affirmed.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION WERE GRANTED,
IT COULD NOT BE MADE RETROACTIVE
BACK TO THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE
MOTION FOR MODIFICATION
Defendant correctly concedes in his brief that the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to make any modification
in child support and alimony retroactive is in accord with
Utah law.

This Court did, in fact, clearly speak on that

issue in Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580, 583
(1967).

The court there was faced with a similar request

for a retroactive modification of a divorce decree.

In re-

spending to that claim, the Court explained the rule of
law applicable in this State as follows:
"The usual rule is that a judgment for
alimony payable in monthly or other periodic installments cannot be changed or
modified after the installments have
become due. [Citations omitted.]
The right to such accrued installment payments vested in the Plaintiff upon the due date of each installment, and the Plaintiff is entitled to
interest thereon at the legal rate until
payment is made. [Citations omitted.]
Accordingly, the lower court was correct
in its holding that it had no power or
authority to change or modify the Nevada
judgment as to the accrued installments
of alimony thereunder.
Defendant has demonstrated no good reason why this
court should now modify or overturn that long standing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rule of law in this jurisdiction.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
OF HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES
ON THIS APPEAL
As demonstrated hereinabove, the Judgment entered by the
trial court denying Defendant's Motion for Modification of the
Decree of Divorce and awarding to Plaintiff back alimony and
child support should be affirmed.

This appeal was necessitated

solely by the actions of the Defendant and is without merit.
Accordingly, pursuant to the rules set down in Keiger v.
Keiger, 59 Utah 2d 167, 506 P.2d 441 (1973) and Ehninger v.
Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977), this Court should enter
its Order declaring Plaintiff is entitled to her reasonable
attorney's fees on this Appeal and remanding the case to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of
such fees to be awarded.
CONCLUSION
The trial court acted properly and within its discretion denying Defendant's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce
by reducing or eliminating the payment of child support and
alimony and in awarding to Plaintiff judgment for back alimony
and child support payments unpaid by Defendant.

The Judgment

of the District Court should, accordingly, be affirmed in all
respects.

Plaintiff should further be awarded her costs of

appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees, and the case
- 12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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should be remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary
hearing on the amount of such costs and fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

this /

7.,(_

day of

No Ve

1982.

GLEN E. DAVIES
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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